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CONGRESSIONAL RETRACTION OF FEDERAL COURT
JURISDICTION TO PROTECT THE RESERVED POWERS
OF THE STATES: THE HELMS PRAYER BILL AND A
RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
JAMES MCCLELLAN t

S

INCE THE EARLIEST DAYS OF THE WARREN COURT,
countless bills have been introduced in Congress which would
deny the federal courts jurisdiction over a great variety of subjects
ranging from busing to abortion.' The exceptions clause of article
III of the Constitution provides Congress with the authority to
enact such bills. 2

While none of these proposed bills has been

enacted into law, it is noteworthy that two have passed at least one
house of Congress, and that both of these have sought to deny all
federal courts, including the Supreme Court, jurisdiction over
certain cases arising under the fourteenth amendment. The first
of these two bills, introduced by Representative William Tuck of
Virginia in the 88th Congress in 1964, would have eliminated federal court jurisdiction over state legislative apportionments. It
passed the House of Representatives but was defeated in the Senate.3

The second measure, the Helms Prayer Bill,4 passed the

Senate two years ago but failed to get out of the House Judiciary
Committee. The Helms Bill sought to deny all federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving voluntary prayer in the public schools.5
t Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Separation of Powers Subcommittee,
United States Senate Judiciary Committee. B.A., University of Alabama, 1960;
Ph.D., 1964, J.D., 1981, University of Virginia.

1. See Baucus & Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the
Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REv. 988, 992-94 (1982).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The exceptions clause states: "the
Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." Id.
3. See H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
4. S. 210, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See also note 5 and accompanying
text infra.
5. The Helms Prayer Bill originally was an amendment to a bill which
created the Department of Education. S. 210, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
The amendment proposed by Senator Helms would have added two new
sections to 28 U.S.C.:
§ 1259. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1253, 1254, and
1257 of this chapter the Supreme Court shall not have jurisdiction to
review, by appeal, writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any case arising out
of any State statute [which] relates to voluntary prayers in public
schools and public buildings.
(1019)
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Its chief sponsor was Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, who
has been introducing similar legislation since 1974. He has again
introduced it in the 97th Congress, and its chances of passage seem
excellent, not only because it passed before under a Democrat-controlled Senate, but also because it was endorsed by the Republican
Party platform of 1980 and apparently also by President Reagan.6
These bills limiting jurisdiction all have one subject in common: they all deal with civil rights issues. This is true of every bill
introduced since 1957 which has challenged the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.7 Moreover, these bills all involve the fourteenth
amendment. While a few deal with rights under the equal protection clause, the overwhelming majority-of which the Helms Bill
is representative-affect rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights as
applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Individually considered, they represent a rejection of specific Supreme Court holdings. Taken together, however, they reveal a distinct pattern of widespread dissatisfaction
with the Court's nationalization of the Bill of Rights, or what is
§ 1364. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the district
courts shall not have jurisdiction of any case or question which the
Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to review under Section
1259 . ..
S. 210, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The Helms amendment was subsequently
attached to a bill dealing with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See
S. 450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The House Judiciary Committee, however,
refused to take action on the measure. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 57 (10th ed. 1980); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1981 Supp.).
Proposed amendments to the Constitution which would reverse the
Supreme Court's decision on prayers in public schools have been introduced
in most sessions of Congress since 1962. Such an amendment sponsored by
Senator Everett Dirksen during the 88th Congress achieved the widest support.
On September 21, 1966, Dirksen carried a majority of the Senate with him,
but the vote of 49-37 fell short of the two-thirds necessary to propose a constitutional amendment. Dirksen's proposed amendment (S.J. Res. 148) was
one of the 150 measures introduced in the 88th Congress to reverse the Court's
holding in the prayer decision. See 2 CONGRESS AND THE NATION 410-11 (1969).
6. The Republican Party platform states: "We support Republican initiatives in the Congress to restore the right of individuals to participate in
voluntary, non-denominational prayer in schools and other public facilities.
We applaud the action of the Senate in passing such legislation." CONG. Q.
2035 (July 19, 1980). President Reagan specifically supported congressional
efforts to restore voluntary prayer in the schools in an interview with reporters
from the Washington Star. The text of the interview is printed in the Washington Star, August 5, 1981, at A-4.
7. During the Warren Court years, Congress was provoked by several of
the Court's decisions. In response, the Jenner-Butler Bill was introduced to
curtail Supreme Court jurisdiction over cases involving subversive activity and

state bar admissions. S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The Jenner-Butler
Bill thus represents the first of a continuing series of bills which seek to withdraw the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and/or the lower federal courts in
cases relating to certain specified civil rights.
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commonly referred to as the doctrine of incorporation." Although
no member of Congress has articulated the conflict in quite these
terms, it is clear that what we are witnessing is something more
than random dissatisfaction with judicial legislation. More fundamentally, these legislative efforts to reverse the Court are part of a
growing, and increasingly popular, movement in Congress to return power over civil rights to the states. The controversy, then,
is not simply about the substantive meaning of these rights, but
about federalism. It is not simply about what our rights are, but
about who is to say what they are.
Indeed, none of the bills limiting federal court jurisdiction introduced over the past twenty years has sought to impose upon the
American people or the states a single-minded, monolithic definition of a particular liberty guaranteed by the Bill of Rights or by
the fourteenth amendment. Instead, these bills invariably seek to
lodge final review in the state supreme courts and to allow the
states to decide for themselves the content of individual freedom.9
Thus, the thrust of this legislation is not uniformity, but diversity.
As I shall presently argue, this is not only entirely in keeping with
the original purpose of the Bill of Rights, but also is a modest
attempt at restoring the original design of our constitutional system. Our federal system, as originally conceived, left the individual
states free to define the civil rights of their citizens because the Bill
of Rights was applicable only to the federal government.1 0 Nevertheless, this system has been radically altered-without an explicit
constitutional amendment and without public debate over the
merits of the alteration-by the Supreme Court's incorporation of
8. For a discussion of the doctrine of incorporation, see notes 29-44 and

accompanying text infra.

9. There are opposing views regarding the effect of withdrawal of
Supreme Court jurisdiction. One writer, proceeding upon the assumption of
judicial supremacy, argues that once the Court's jurisdiction is removed, its
prior decisions on the issue will be "frozen." Thus, the state courts by virtue
of their obligation under the supremacy clause, will be forced to uphold the
presumably unpopular Supreme Court decisions on the issue. See Redish,
Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under
the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L.
Rxv. 900, 925 (1982).
Most scholars agree, however, that once the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction is removed, the state courts would be free to interpret the Constitution as they saw fit and could disregard prior Supreme Court decisions.
See Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REv. 929, 936-38 (1982).
10. For a discussion of how the Framers viewed the Bill of Rights, see
text accompanying notes 12-17 infra.
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the Bill of Rights into the word "liberty" in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment."
Turning back to the period during which the Bill of Rights
was considered and adopted, we recall that it was George Mason
of Virginia who proposed at the Constitutional Convention of 1787
that a declaration of rights be included in the Constitution. 12 Yet,
Elbridge Gerry's motion that a committee be appointed to prepare
such a statement was voted down unanimously. The members of
the Convention generally agreed that a bill of rights was unnecessary
since the expressly enumerated powers of the federal government
did not include power over "the liberties of the people." 1- Without much of a struggle, however, the Federalist supporters of the
Constitution agreed to the adoption of a bill of rights during the
ratification effort in the state conventions. 4 One reason they so
readily acceded to Antifederalist demands for a bill of rights was
that they felt such a declaration changed nothing regarding the
constitutional structure, and neither reduced federal power nor
increased state power.15 The Bill of Rights, in other words, simply
declared what was already understood by the Framers of the Constitution-that the national government had no authority in the
general area of civil liberties. Thus, Federalists and Antifederalists
were in general agreement that the states, not the federal government, would determine under their own bills of rights the meaning
and substance of civil liberty within their respective jurisdictions.
As James Madison explained in the Federalist, "the powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the State." 16 Consequently, the debate in 1787 was not
over the substantive meaning of the civil liberties, but rather over
11. For a discussion of the doctrine of incorporation, see text accompanying notes 29-44 infra.
12. See 5

J.

ELLIOT,

THE

DEBATES

ON

THE

CONSTITUTION 538 (1888).
See also J. MADISON,
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 630 (A. Koch ed.
INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 124-26 (1931).

630.

13. See 5 J. ELLIOT, supra note 12, at 538;
See generally B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL

ADOPTION

OF

THE

FEDERAL

NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE
1966); B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN

J.

MADISON,
RIGHTS:

supra note 12, at

A
437-38 (1971).
14. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 762-66, 852, 932-33.
OF

DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY

15. See id.
CONSTITUTION

16.
added).

See also

145 (1971).

THE FEDERALIST

J.

MCCLELLAN,

JOSEPH STORY

AND THE AMERICAN

No. 44 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol27/iss5/7

4

McClellan: Congressional Retraction of Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect
1981-82]

RESERVED POWERS OF THE STATES

1023

the issue of whether the Constitution should be explicit regarding
7
their enforcement.'
It is important to bear in mind, therefore, that the Bill of
Rights actually had a dual purpose: to protect each individual
against the abridgment of his civil liberties by the federal government, and to assure each state that the federal government would
not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the states over such matters.
In the latter regard, the Bill of Rights is essentially a states' rights
document. Each amendment was a guarantee to the individual
and to the states. Indeed, the protection of states' rights by the Bill
of Rights was widely regarded in 1791 as far more important than
the protection it afforded to the individual. Six of the states which
ratified the Constitution urged the adoption of numerous amendments before it went into effect.'
With respect to those proposed
amendments, Benjamin F. Wright has noted:
It has frequently been stated that the motive behind these
amendments was a desire to secure greater protection for
the natural rights of the people. This is true only in part.
An examination of the proposals of the first three States to
make them, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and New
Hampshire, will afford sufficient evidence of the fact that
the members of these conventions were much more disturbed about the rights and powers of the States than
about the rights of the people. 19
Massachusetts proposed nine amendments, but only the sixth, which
referred to indictment by grand jury, dealt with individual liberty
as such. The short list proposed by South Carolina made mention
of "the freedom of the people," but otherwise dealt with the issue
of the "sovereignty of the states," while of the twelve proposed
amendments offered by New Hampshire, only the last three had a
direct bearing on individual liberty. Only Virginia and North
Carolina, it seems, proposed a true bill of rights for the people. 20
Of further significance is the fact that the First Congress, which
proposed the Bill of Rights, rejected an attempt to apply portions
17. See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
18. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 146. See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 13, at 762-66, 852, 932-33.
19. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 146.
20. See id. at 146-47. For an analysis of the origin and development of
the Bill of Rights, as well as the effect of the doctrine of incorporation on
the Framers' view of the Bill of Rights, see J. MCCLELLAN, supra note 15, at
142-59.
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of it to the states. The fifth resolution of James Madison's proposed series of amendments for a bill of rights provided that "[n]o
State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of
the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases." 21 But, Madison's
suggestion was defeated in the Senate. As Tucker of South Carolina
observed:
This [proposal] is offered as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but it goes only to the alteration of the constitutions of particular States. It will be
much better, I apprehend, to leave the State Governments
to themselves, and not to interfere with them more than
we already do; and that is thought by many to be rather
22
too much.
Charles Pinckney, a Framer of the Constitution, later explained
the purpose and effect of the Bill of Rights in these striking words:
When those amendments became a part of the Constitution, it is astonishing how much it reconciled the States to
that measure; they considered themselves as secure in those
points on which they were the most jealous; they supposed
they had placed the hand of their own authority on the
rights of religion and the press, and .. .that they could
with safety say to themselves: 'On these subjects we are in
future secure; we know what they mean and are at present;
and such as they now are, such are they to remain, until
altered by the authority of the people themselves-no inferior power can touch them.' 28
For nearly a century and a half, the Supreme Court respected
these views, thereby securing one of the major objectives of the
Bill of Rights. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice
Marshall declared in Barron v. Baltimore 24 that the first eight
amendments "contain no expression indicating an intention to
apply them to the state governments." 25 This position was consistently maintained in subsequent decisions involving the first,
fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments between 1833
21. 1

ANNALS OF CONG.

435

(J. Gates ed. 1789).

22. Id. at 755.

23. 10

ANNALS OF CONG.

128 (1800).

24. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
25. Id. at 250.
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and 1868.26 In Permoli v. New Orleans,27 for example, a unanimous
Court upheld a municipal ordinance challenged by the Catholic
Church as a denial of the free exercise of religion, asserting that
"[t]he Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens
of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the
State constitutions and laws." 28 Even after the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, which prohibited the states from denying
any person "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," 29
the Supreme Court continued to follow and apply Barron-afactor
strongly supportive of the view that the fourteenth amendment
was not intended, by those who witnessed its creation and sought
to apply its provisions, to defeat the original purpose of the Bill of
Rights. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, state and federal courts uniformly upheld the principle
that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government.
"In at least twenty cases between 1877 and 1907," Charles Warren
observed, "the Court was required to rule upon this point and to
reaffirm Marshall's decision of 1833." 30 As late as 1922, in
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek,31 the Court declared that
"neither the fourteenth amendment nor any provision of the Constitution imposes restrictions upon the state about freedom of
speech." 32
The Court suddenly reversed itself in 1925 when it offhandedly
remarked in Gitlow v. New York 3 that "[f]or present purposes
26. See, e.g., Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868)
(sixth amendment inapplicable to the states); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867) (eighth amendment applies only to the national
government); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1855) (fifth amendment
inapplicable to the states); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855)
(fourth amendment inapplicable to the states); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
410 (1847) (fifth amendment applies only to the federal government); Permoli
v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845) (first amendment not applicable to
the states); Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469 (1833) (seventh
amendment inapplicable to the states).
27. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
28. Id. at 609.
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. This amendment states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id., § 1, cl. 2.
30. Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
HARv. L. REV. 431, 436 (1926).

31. 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
32. Id. at 543.
33. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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we may and do assume that freedom of speech and press-which
are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the states." 34 Thus began the piecemeal incorporation of first amendment freedoms into the word "liberty"
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, reversing
sub silentio the Barron decision and thereby undermining one of
the great objects of the Bill of Rights, i.e., exclusive state jurisdiction and control over the freedoms protected by the first eight
amendments. In 1931, in Near v. Minnesota,3 5 the Court embarked
upon the revolutionary course outlined in Gitlow by incorporating
the freedoms of speech and press into the fourteenth amendment.
In subsequent cases, the Court arbitrarily transferred the freedom
of assembly 8e and the freedom of religion37 into the fourteenth
amendment, finally completing the incorporation of the first amendment with the inclusion of the establishment clause in Everson v.
Board of Education 88 in 1947. Since 1961 the doctrine of incor42
41
40
39
poration has been extended to the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth,

and ninth amendments. 43 As Charles Fairman has noted, however,
"the record of history is overwhelmingly against" the idea that
section 1 of the fourteenth amendment "was intended and understood to impose Amendments I to VIII upon the states." 44
34. Id. at 666.

35. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
36. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
37. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
38. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
39. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment right
to exclude from criminal trials illegally seized evidence); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949) (fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures).
40. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment
right against double jeopardy); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination).
41. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to a jury
trial); Washington v. Davis, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a
speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confrontation);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
42. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
43. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill
of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 139 (1949).
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Viewed in historical perspective, the Everson case was significant in two respects. For the first time, the Supreme Court inter45
preted the establishment clause as a restriction on the states.
By this bold and fundamental innovation the Court overturned
more than a century of constitutional law that had regularly permitted the states to determine church-state relationships in accordance with their own laws and constitutions. Second, and
equally novel, was the Court's absolutist theory of religious establishment which held that the first amendment erected a "wall of
separation" between church and state which prohibited a state
from giving any aid of any kind-not merely to specific religious
sects but to religion generally."6

Based upon its pronouncements

in Everson, the Court subsequently ruled in Engel v. Vitale47 that
the voluntary recitation of a state-composed school prayer, though
nondenominational, constituted an establishment of religion.
The Framers of the Bill of Rights were generally inclined
toward the view that government had a duty to promote religion
and morality in society, and at the time the Bill of Rights was
adopted, most states actually provided varying degrees of aid to
established religions within their jurisdictions."8 The "wall of
separation" rhetoric, which appears in a private letter written by
Thomas Jefferson, 49 was not widely accepted even in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The State of Massachusetts, for
example, actually required bible-reading in the public schools in
1826, and between 1913 and 1930, eleven more states enacted similar
statutes. 0 Little wonder that Mark de Wolfe Howe has described
45. 330 U.S. at 8.
46. Id. at 18.

47. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
48. See S. COBB, THE

RISE

OF RELIGIOUS

LIBERTY

IN

AMERICA

(1902);

THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE
W. SWEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION IN
STATES OF AMERICA (1895);

I. CORNELISON,
UNITED

(1950). McClellan, The Making and Unmaking of the Establishment
Clause, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM (1981).
49. The phrase is taken from a letter of Jefferson to the Baptist Association of Danbury, Connecticut, 1802, which reads in part: "I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people, which declared
that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of
separation between church and state." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the
Baptist Association of Danbury, Connecticut (1802), reprinted in C. RICE,
AMERICA

THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER

50. A.

JOHNSON

& F. YOST,

63 (1964).

SEPARATION

OF

CHURCH

AND

STATE

IN

THE

33 (1934). The following states enacted similar statutes: Pennsylvania in 1913, Delaware and Tennessee in 1915, New Jersey in 1916, Alabama in 1919, Georgia in 1921, Maine in 1923, Kentucky in 1924, Florida
and Idaho in 1925, and Arkansas in 1930. Id.
UNITED STATES
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the Court's incorporation of the establishment clause and its imposition of the "wall of separation" doctrine as a complete "distortion of the intellectual background of the First Amendment." I'
In response to these developments, the Helms Prayer Bill seeks
to restore the establishment clause to its original purpose, for its
effect would be to lodge in the highest courts of each state final
authority over questions involving this one aspect of state aid to
religion. 52 Regardless of the success or failure of the bill, Senate
consideration of its merits will serve to focus public attention on
the origin and purpose of both the establishment clause and the
Bill of Rights generally, while possibly generating debate over the
doctrine of incorporation itself-a public debate that is long overdue and goes to the very heart of the fundamental question of
whether it is wise or proper for nine unelected judicial officials,
serving for life, to possess the awesome power of deciding what our
freedoms shall be.
When our Constitution was adopted, the American people overwhelmingly agreed that liberty is safest when protected at the state
and local level. The doctrine of incorporation, which has become
the great wellspring of judicial activism in our time, thus runs
counter to the basic proposition upon which our nation was
founded. 53 Putting aside the issue of whether Congress has the
authority under article III to limit the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and return jurisdiction seized by the Court
back to the states 54-a question which both the Constitution and
the Court itself have, in this writer's judgment, answered in the
affirmative-the great strength of the Helms Prayer Bill lies in the
fact that it promises to stimulate public discussion and debate
about the very essence of the American political system.
In another sense, of course, the debate over court regulation
under the exceptions clause of article III is one of separation of
powers and democratic theory. We live in a democratic republic,
51. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 31 (1965). For further
discussion of the historical background of the first amendment, see E. CORWIN,
A CONSTrrUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE (1951); F. O'BRIEN, JUSTICE
REED AND THE FIrST AMENDMENT (1958).
52. For the text and a discussion of the Helms Prayer Bill, see notes 4-6
and accompanying text supra.
53. For a discussion of the doctrine of incorporation, see notes 29-44 and
accompanying text supra.
54. Other commentators have determined that Congress has plenary power
under the exceptions clause to control Supreme Court jurisdiction. See Bator,
Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 1030, 1038-41 (1982); Redish, supra note 9, at 902-03; Rice, Congress and
Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 959, 975 (1982).
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based on separation of powers and checks and balances. Without
the power to regulate the Court's jurisdiction, particularly when
the Court exceeds its authority by creating its own jurisdiction,
Congress is helpless to limit the judicial power and the Court is
exempted from the checks and balances system-sitting, like a continuous constitutional convention, rewriting the fundamental law.
This is not only inconsistent with the basic principle of limited
government, but makes judicial review intolerable in a democratic
society. Certainly no society can justly call itself democratic where
as few as five appointed justices, who are beyond the control of the
people and their elected representatives, can determine the meaning
and substance of nearly all the freedoms that the people possess.
And certainly, no constitution can be said to be based upon a separation of powers or federalism when one of the branches of the national government is free to usurp the functions of the legislature
and the powers of the states.
Jurisdiction-limiting bills, like the Helms Prayer Bill, are
clearly consistent with the basic principles of separation of powers
and federalism. Moreover, these bills represent a return to an allocation of power consistent with the original intent of the Framers,
and are essential to protect the rights of the people. At the very
least, the American people, speaking through their representatives
in Congress, have the right to decide which government and which
courts shall protect their liberties. The exceptions clause of article
III of the Constitution gives them that right.
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